Beirut, the week
before the new year
I did not write in the
first place. I was not (into) writing at all. I could not do it, nor commit to
it. I was not reading much either. Not until I went to college, and it was that
complete fiasco of entering into college as a bio-chemistry (premed) major that
forced me into excessive reading, then, much later, into wanting to be a
writer. The disconnection with society and the world-at-large could not be
anymore concealed. Rather it is, indeed, the sine qua non of my shattered existence, or of my parlêtre, as Lacan would say, meaning
that being-into-language. What I like about Lacan is that he does not conceive
language as a “tool” for “communication,” but as an entity inscribed within the body, without which the body would be
shapeless and motionless. That it hasn’t been revealed earlier, in my teens, is
a constant source of regret. Was I too docile back then, wearing a
mask-of-satisfaction, like a protective shell, that I did not believe in? Is it
a character flaw? But even the disaster of the college experience—from its
first weeks—did not propel that urge to write. With the urge to read there was
no urge to write yet. That damn sense of urgency,
that writing should matter more than oxygen, was not there. We tend to think modern Arabic through a détour—that we
learn “it,” we learn its potentials, by going through the other major Latin
languages: French, English, and to some, German. We learn modernity from the
potentials of the likes of French and English; then come back to Arabic as a
language of “lacks” of sorts, assuming we ever come back to it. Maybe we’ve
abandoned it in the first place, with no desire to learn it, to be-with-Arabic.
If language is the house of being, as Heidegger has claimed, then we’re into an
orphaned culture without language. This Arabic which has stubbornly maintained
itself for more than fifteen centuries, beginning with the notorious poetic and
pre-Islamic seven muᶜallaqāt, gives us that feeling of inaccessibility. The
Jāhiliyya of the muᶜallaqāt had at least a sense of community, because
some of the best poems of the time were “hanged” on the Kaᶜba,
which was allegedly a pagan monument, prior to passing to the prophetic hands.
I should have done the same since high school, with an urgent sense to write
for a (virtual) community. I’ve learned since then to procrastinate and defer
endlessly—defer the writing process. When I did my first book, I wrote it in
French, but I was ill at ease in the whole process. Not much of a jouissance,
not even the modicum of pleasure. I had the writing of the likes of Foucault
and Braudel in mind, but had no idea where to situate my first serious project
on the political economy of Damascus. Which is precisely the cultural and
political problem of the eastern Mediterranean: the absence of a viable
narrative, something that would make sense at least for the last couple
centuries. I want a prose that makes me feel “one” with the city; I want to
feel that I belong to it; and that she belongs to me. Instead, I happen to come
and go like a stranger. There is a notion of stranger that I do not mind,
propounded by the German sociologist Georg Simmel: a stranger is not only
someone who must learn the shared codes of society, but, more importantly, he
is seen by others as having “not yet” learned those norms, that he is not one
of us, and will never be. But then no one would take you seriously if you
simply learn the norms, adapt, and behave well. The stranger must reveal the
insidiousness of those norms, how treacherous and uncanny they are.
Hence this whole
theory of my hands tied by divine ordinance, parental repression, fatherly
superego which forbids jouissance, all of this does not make sense. I was not into writing to begin with, and this has
been an agony ever since I’ve realized the importance of writing, of believing in
it, of investing into and being committed into it. It’s like being in love: to
give what we don’t have to someone who does not want it. Because such a mindset
was not there to begin with, say, as a teenager, where it should have all
begun, it has always been an agony. Going public has also been another of those
agonizing experiences. Instead of repression pure and simple, we should think
in terms of shame, anxiety, castration of the body.
Think of photography
in terms of the relationship between the object produced by the photograph and
the reality of the setting. Ultimately, there is no reality outside the artifact
of the object. Likewise, the signifier does not represent a trace of reality,
but represents a subject which makes its apparition into the real, by effacing
the original trace, while substituting itself into the infinite chain of
signifiers that make reality possible—comprehensible by being discursive.
At a downtown
bookstore my eyes caught the title of a just published French novel: “the
artist of sex.” In one passage picked at random, the mother tells her daughter
that men are miles away from women, will never figure out how to bring them to
sexual jouissance—not even pleasure. Forget therefore about the missionary
position and its affiliates (so-called oral and anal sex, no such terms exist
in French), as they won’t even bring even a modicum of pleasure. And the mother
raves on: men would do better masturbating on their own, but they need the
woman to exhort their masculinity and honor games. Ultimately, the daughter
went for the artistry of sado-masochism, though it remains unclear if such move
was at the mother’s exhortation. We see her commanding and receiving pain,
though it could be only one way: I like receiving pain but not giving it, or
vice versa. The woman as dominatrix, subjugating men to her desire—would that
bring the much heralded jouissance of the flesh? Which reminds me of Talal Asad
on judicial torture in the late middle ages, perhaps a transformation in the
12th and 13th centuries, if not earlier. Medieval Christian torture became a
doctrinal necessity to “see” what was “inside” the flesh and soul, as if it was
not enough to simply claim belief (as is the case in Islam), as the latter
could not be externalized and offered for evaluation by the Other. The body is
therefore subject to torture with the hope that it would deliver a certain
truth, hence a system of symbolic utterances called knowledge of the soul (or
self). Foucault who was into S&M himself wanted his sexual practices for
the sheer pleasure of the flesh: but is that possible? Can sexuality be
conceptualized outside discourse?
An Indian critic à la
Chakrabarty, Aijaz Ahmad, notes how much Said’s Orientalism owes to the
Foucauldian topology of epistemic systems, that of the “order of things,”
whereby an epistemic structure is valid for a particular time-space framework.
My problem with all this Orientalism saga is that it is not even concerned with
the massive work that is needed to recover the essence of the third-world
texts. Only when such work is done, only when such texts are taken seriously
for their own sake, can we speak of a recovered modest dignity.
The smells of this
city. Nothing like Damascus or Aleppo, the quintessential city of smells.
Everything is more modest here. On a warm Saturday afternoon I took it to the
back streets. Many shops had their electricity out, part of the daily
three-hour-minimum rationing. That smell of being old: shops that belong to the
1950s and 1960s, simply because they are benefiting from the old-rent law. The
oldness is a far cry from Aleppo, which still smells the Ottoman centuries. With
my narcissistic psyche, I kept pondering, Why did I leave? Why did I go west?
Too late perhaps, now that I’m “enjoying” the city—the jouissance of the
pervert. What is it that I know now that I did not know then? Is it a question
of knowledge? We do not progress as individuals; what time and duration bring
to us is that “insertion” of present knowledge into a past where supposedly it
was “not there” “yet.” But it was
there—in an embryonic form—and that’s precisely what we appreciate: I love my
fate, because it was all there from day one; I can now better appreciate why I
did what I did. No regrets; only one failure after another. A friend of mine
once gave me the greatest reward: Tu réussis tous
tes échecs;
you’re so damn good at succeeding in all your failures. So fucking French
erotic!
On the long run we’ll
all be dead. On the short run, however, even if we indulge into serious
relationships, even if we’re committed, we’re at the end of the day alone. Yet,
being alone-alone is not like being alone-in-a-relationship. The latter poses
the fundamental question, What is it being-with-an-Other?, which the
alone-alone would not even dare to question. How to “be” “with” that Other,
whether another being, or non-being, remains the fundamental dilemma of our
times.
I did not buy this
story of the Wall Street broker who all of a sudden turns as photographer of
prostitutes and drug users in the larger New York area in order to “discover”
the existence of God in himself, like a medieval sufi, leaving behind all
speculative wealth—and atheism. It seems that in both instances—from Wall
Street to the drug addicts and the prostitutes—there is a jouissance of excess:
from the excesses of speculative capital to those of the deterioration of body
and soul. In both instances, however, there is that jouissance that emerges
from the deterioration-as-excess. It could be reformulated as the “quest for
excitement,” to use Norbert Elias’ formulation of sports in general. As to the
photography on Flickr, it has a blatant voyeuristic element into it which could
be termed “enjoying the pain of others.” The top photographers of the last
century have come to realize that what remains outside the frame, and which is
left at the viewer’s discretion, is equally important, if not more crucial, than
what we see on the “screen” in front of us. In the photography depicting drug
addicts and prostitutes in the New York area, we’re told in every frame that
“there must be something important to see,” which is right in front of us, and,
frankly, as a viewer, I find myself deprived of my imaginative powers, like
bombarded with pornographic images. How is this related to God’s existence and
religion? The thesis that there is an atheistic rupture between Wall Street and
God neither makes sense historically nor sociologically. Max Weber has amply
demonstrated the correlations between the Protestant ethic and capitalism. More
importantly, the entire history of capitalism, since its inception in the
Italian city-states in the 13th and 14th centuries points to a process of
“accommodation” between the Church and capitalism, so that, for example, usury
is “approved” in spite of earlier prohibitions in both Christianity and
Judaism. So let’s not think even for a moment that our financial markets are
godless! It is precisely because God is dead, that prohibitions are all over
the place, that nothing is permitted. Because religion cannot serve anymore as
that grandiose framework that encompasses all aspects of life, God must be
exhausted at the sight of all those folks who turn towards him for help, like
our broker-cum-photographer: God is in deep pain, not at the sight of drug
addicts and prostitutes (he is not into social security), however, but at all
those morons who “discover” him all of a sudden—asking for help, because they
lost faith in the financial markets!
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